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APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT ORDER 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT 
FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
JUDGE HOMER WILKINSON. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a district court order granting a 
Motion for Summary Judgment for the defendant from the Third 
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. This Court 
has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2-2 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
The following rules are essential to the determination of 
this appeal: 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56(c) states in pertinent 
part: 
. . • The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith 
if the pleadings, depositions/ answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. . . 
RELEVANT FACTS OF THE CASE 
The defendant is in agreement with the plaintiff's 
statements concerning the relevant facts of the case with three 
exceptions: 
(1) The Bicycle Center is a retail seller of Cannondale 
Bicycles. Appellant's Brief Page 5, Para. 1. 
Response: The defendant, Cannondale Bicycle Company 
("CBC")/ is not in agreement with the plaintiff's statement. The 
Bicycle Center ("BC") is a retail business that sells, among 
other things, Cannondale Bicycles. (R. 469). 
(2) The Bicycle Center repaired the brakes and discarded 
the defective parts which had caused the malfunction. 
Appellant's Brief Page 6, Para. 6. 
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Response: The defendant CBC is not in agreement with this 
statement. The plaintiff has made an incorrect and unsupported 
statement. It has not been established by any supportable 
evidence that the brakes were "defective" or that they were 
discarded by the defendant BC. 
(3) Mr. Blomquist admitted that a defect in the bicycle had 
caused the accident. Appellant's Brief Page 8, Para. 12, Fn. 1. 
Response: The defendant CBC is not in agreement with this 
statement. The plaintiff incorrectly states that Mr. Blomquist 
admitted that a "defect" in the bicycle had caused the accident. 
What in fact Mr. Blomquist actually admitted was that a 
"malfunction" in the bicycle had caused the accident. (R. 679, 
Para. 5; R. 683, Para. 5) There is a significant difference in 
the definitions of "defect" and "malfunction". 
Therefore, based upon the foregoing responses, the defendant 
CBC disputes such statements made by the plaintiff concerning the 
relevant facts of the case. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The plaintiff has failed to establish prima facie cases of a 
products liability action, and a spoliation of evidence action 
against the defendant CBC, therefore there is no genuine issue of 
material fact in this case that would preclude the entry of a 
motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendant CBC, as a 
matter of law. 
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In order to establish a prima facie case against the 
defendant CBC in a products liability action, the plaintiff must: 
1) Identify that component of CBC's product that 
allegedly caused the injury; 
2) Show that the product had not been modified 
or altered from the time it left defendant 
CBC until the time of the accident; 
3) Show that the product was defective and 
unreasonably dangerous; and 
4) Show that the defective condition proximately 
caused the plaintiff's injury. 
Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co,, 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979) 
and Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6 (1977, as amended). The plaintiff 
must establish by a preponderance of the evidence each and every 
element of his products liability action. See Weber v. 
Sprincrville, 725 P.2d 1360 (Utah 1986) . In the case at bar, the 
plaintiff has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence items 
two, three, or four of the test to establish a prima facie case 
of products liability against the defendant CBC as required by 
Hahn. 
In addition, the plaintiff has not established a prima facie 
case of spoliation of evidence against CBC. In order to prove a 
prima facie case of spoliation, the plaintiff must first find 
that CBC is vicariously liable for the alleged acts of BC in 
allegedly destroying a defective part. Under agency law in Utah, 
the existence of an agency relationship, and the scope of the 
authority of the agent, must be determined from the acts and 
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conduct of the principle, not the agent. See City Elec. v. Dean 
Evans Chrysler-Plymouth, 672 P.2d 89, 90 (Utah 1983) . In the 
case at bar, the plaintiff has not established that BC was CBC's 
agent acting within the scope of its authority when it allegedly 
spoliated evidence. The plaintiff has submitted no evidence, 
whatsoever, that show that CBC authorized BC to spoliate 
evidence. Furthermore, neither Mr. Blomquist nor the BC were 
under a duty to preserve any of the parts allegedly removed from 
the plaintiff's bicycle, nor were they on notice that a products 
liability action would be filed against them at the time the part 
was allegedly discarded. 
Therefore, the defendant CBC respectfully submits that this 
Court affirm its motion for summary judgment based upon the fact 
that the plaintiff has not shown a prima facie case of a products 
liability action nor a spoliation of evidence action. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I, 
THE ADMISSION BY BC THAT THE PIAINTIFF#S BICYCLE 
MALFUNCTIONED CAUSING HIM INJURY, ALONE. DOES NOT CREATE 
A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE THE 
ENTRY OF A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS MATTER OF LAW. 
The standard which applies to motions for summary judgment 
are stated in Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 
56 basically states that "a motion for summary judgment should be 
granted only if the pleadings, depositions, admissions and 
affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 
1982) . Where no material fact remains at issue, the Utah Court 
of Appeals reviews the trial court's conclusions of law for 
correctness. Dvbowski v. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc., 775 P.2d 445, 446 
(Utah App. 1989). 
The plaintiff contends that the admission by Mr. Blomquist 
that Dr. Burn's bicycle malfunctioned causing him to get into an 
accident is a material issue of fact that precludes entry of 
summary judgment. Appellant's Brief Page 14-15. Plaintiff 
argues that because the "defendants' expert testified that in his 
opinion the brakes could not have caused the accident/ the 
admission of the defendant that a malfunction of the bicycle 
caused the accident creates a factual dispute which precludes 
summary judgment." Id. 
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The mere "existence of disputed facts will not defeat 
summary judgment when the plaintiff fails to make a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to 
his case, and on which he will bear the burden of proof at 
trial." Garzee v. Barklev, 828 P.2d 334, 337 (Idaho App. 1992); 
See also, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 
2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). 
In the case at bar, plaintiff attempts to create a disputed 
fact without establishing the elements essential to his case. 
This case is a personal injury products liability action. In 
order to prove a prima facie case against the defendant the 
plaintiff must: 
(1) Identify that component of CBC's product that 
allegedly caused the injury; 
(2) Show that the product had not been modified or 
altered from the time it left CBC until the time of the 
accident; 
(3) Show that the product was defective and 
unreasonably dangerous; and 
(4) Show that the defective condition proximately 
caused the plaintiff's injury. 
Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 
1979); Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6 (1977, as amended). (R. 471). 
The plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence each and every element of his products liability action. 
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See Weber v. Sprinqville, 725 P.2d 1360 (Utah 1986). "A mere 
possibility of such causation is not enough; and when the matter 
remains one of pure speculation or conjecture . . . it becomes 
the duty of the court to direct the verdict for the defendant." 
Id. at 1367. In our case, plaintiff has suggested that the brake 
was the component that allegedly caused the injury. CBC will 
assume for the sake of this argument, only, that the front brake 
caused the accident. Plaintiff has not shown by a preponderance 
of the evidence numbers two, three, or four of the test to 
establish a prima facie case of products liability against the 
defendant CBC as required by Hahn. 
The United States Supreme Court stated in Celotex that: 
[f]acts in dispute cease to be "material" facts when 
the plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case. 
In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue of 
material fact," since a complete failure of proof 
concerning an essential element of the nonmoving 
party's case necessarily renders all other facts 
immaterial• 
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-33, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-58. 
This is the exact circumstance in the case at bar. The 
alleged facts in dispute of whether the brakes could or could not 
have caused the accident are not material because the plaintiff 
cannot prove a prima facie case of a products liability action 
against CBC. The trial court concluded that there was admissible 
evidence to the effect that the brakes on the plaintiff's bicycle 
malfunctioned, and that the malfunction caused the accident, but 
that such evidence was not material, and therefore, did not 
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create a material issue of fact that would preclude granting 
CBC's summary judgment motion. (R. 656). 
In Horaan v. Industrial Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751 (Utah 
1982), the Utah Supreme Court stated that the mere existence of a 
genuine issue of fact in the case, as a whole, does not preclude 
entry of a motion for summary judgment if those issues are 
immaterial to the resolution of the case. See, Heglar Ranch, 
Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 139 (Utah 1988); Norton v. Blackham, 
669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983). 
In a case similar to the one at bar, plaintiff's brought 
suit under an Alabama Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine, alleging 
that the brakes on their 1986 Chevrolet Cavalier failed as a 
result of a defect. Brooks v. Colonial Chevrolet-Buick, 579 
So.2d 1328, 1332 (Ala. 1991) (quoting Thompson v. Lee, 439 So.2d 
113 (Ala. 1983)). The trial court granted the defendant's motion 
for summary judgment because there was no evidence of any defect 
shown by the plaintiff. The Alabama Supreme Court stated that 
the: 
[f]ailure of a product does not presuppose the 
existence of a defect. The fact that someone was 
injured while using a product does not establish that 
the product was unreasonably dangerous when put to its 
intended use. 
Id. 
The court noted that the only evidence the plaintiff's presented 
concerning a defect was their own testimony as to the alleged 
defectiveness of the brakes and the alleged injuries they 
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suffered as a result. Id. at 1333. The court concluded that 
such evidence amounted to mere speculation and conclusorv 
statements insufficient to prove a prima facie case, and found 
that the trial court properly entered the summary judgment in 
favor of the defendant. Id. 
Brooks is very similar to the case at bar. In our case/ the 
plaintiff alleges that a defective brake on his bicycle caused 
his accident which resulted in his personal injuries. Plaintiff 
relies heavily upon Mr. Blomquist's admission that a 
"malfunction" caused the accident, and implies that a 
"malfunction" equates into a "defective" product. This is simply 
incorrect. The definition of "malfunction" is "to function badly 
or imperfectly." The definition of "defective" is "falling below 
an accepted standard in regularity and soundness of form or 
structure." Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1976). 
These words have completely different meanings. The word 
"malfunction" means that something did not work perfectly. In 
contrast/ the word "defective" means a product that falls below 
an accepted standard. The plaintiff must prove that the brake 
was in a "defective" and unreasonably dangerous condition when it 
left CBC's plant/ not that it merely "malfunctioned." A product 
can "malfunction" without it being "defective." 
There is no physical evidence to support the conclusorv and 
speculative statement made by the non-expert plaintiff that the 
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brakes on his bicycle were "defective." (R. 479). In the 
plaintiff's deposition the following conversation took place: 
Q. Now, on other thing, you made the statement that 
you didn't think it was Mr. Blomquist's fault, that 
it was the brake's fault. Is that --
A. I said that, yes. 
Q. Now, but you don't know whose fault it is that the 
brake malfunctioned? 
A. Pretty ignorant of me to say that, stupid or 
ignorant. 
Q. No, Brian, what I am saying, you don't know whose 
fault it is the brake malfunctioned? 
Mr. Hanson: Well, I am not - - Okay, go ahead. He 
said he thinks the brake malfunctioned. 
A. The witness: I feel, what little I know of it, I 
am not an expert. 
Q. But, you don't know, assuming there was a brake 
malfunction of some sort, you don't know whose 
[fault] that is? 
A. Correct. 
[Deposition B. Burns, 188:2-15, R. 473.] [Emphasis Added.] 
The plaintiff cannot rely on his unsubstantiated conclusory 
and speculative statements set forth under oath to create a 
material issue of fact. Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 
1985). Consequently, based upon the fact that the plaintiff can 
not established three of the elements of a prima facie case of a 
products liability action against the defendant CBC, whether or 
not the front brake malfunctioned cannot create a genuine issue 
of material fact that would appropriately preclude this court 
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from affirming the trial courts entry of summary judgment in 
favor of the defendant CBC. Celotex, 106 S.Ct. 248 (1985); 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 106 S.Ct. 3505 (1985). 
POINT II, 
THE PLAINTIFF CANNOT PROVE A PRIMA FACIE 
CASE OF SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE AGAINST CBC 
TO PRECLUDE ENTRY OF A SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION 
The plaintiff contends that CBC is vicariously liable for 
the alleged acts of BC in allegedly destroying a defective part. 
Appellant's Brief Page 16. The plaintiff attempts to impute 
vicarious liability to CBC under the theory that BC was the agent 
for CBC when it allegedly destroyed a defective part. 
It is well established in Utah that the existence of an 
agency relationship, and the scope of the authority of the agent# 
must be determined from the acts and conduct of the principle, 
not the agent. See, City Elec. v. Dean Evans Chrysler-Plymouth. 
672 P.2d 89, 90 (Utah 1983). In the case at bar, the plaintiff 
must establish through CBC that BC was its agent and that BC was 
acting within the scope of its authority when it allegedly 
spoliated the evidence. The plaintiff has submitted no evidence, 
whatsoever, that shows that CBC authorized BC to destroy 
evidence. 
In Zions First Nat. Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 
1090, 1094 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court stated that: 
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[u]nder agency law, an agent cannot make its principle 
responsible for the agent's actions unless the agent is 
acting pursuant to either actual or apparent authority. 
Actual authority incorporates the concepts of express 
and implied authority. Express authority exists 
whenever the principal directly states that its agent 
has the authority to perform a particular act on the 
principals behalf. Implied authority, on the other 
hand, embraces authority to do those acts which are 
incidental to, or are necessary, usual, and proper to 
accomplish or perform, the main authority expressly 
delegated to the agent. 
Id. 
The plaintiff in our case has not presented any evidence 
showing that CBC had given BC any authority to spoliate evidence. 
The plaintiff has no admissible evidence that establishes 
authority given by CBC to BC. All plaintiff has is the testimony 
of Mr. Blomquist, the purported agent, of his understanding of 
the authorization. (R. 553). Nowhere does the plaintiff assert, 
much less identify, facts to support the proposition that CBC 
authorized BC to allegedly spoliate evidence in potential 
products liability actions. Mr. Blomquist testified to the 
following in his deposition taken on April 4, 1990: 
Q. . . . Now, you mentioned earlier, when the 
associate brought the bike in, you don't recall if 
you inspected it only or kept it overnight. In 
any event, did you repair it that day, whatever 
had to be done to it? 
A. I did repair the bike, yes. 
Q. Do you recall what you did to it? 
A. I took the brake cable apart, suspecting that 
could have been the problem. I re-greased the 
cable, put it back together. There was no 
problems at that time, there were not problems, 
really, when I took it apart. 
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Q. Okay. 
A. And I just made sure the brake was centered 
correctly for the wheel and put it in the back 
room and waited for somebody to come pick it up. 
Q. So, the brake assembly was never changed on the 
bike; 
A. Correct. 
[P. Blomquist Deposition, 41-42:11-2, R. 572] [Emphasis Added]. 
In addition, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, 
there are three basic elements for determining whether an 
employee is acting within the scope of employment: 
1) the employee's conduct must be of a general kind 
and nature that the employee is hired to perform; 
2) the conduct must occur within the hours of the 
employee's work and the ordinary spatial 
boundaries of the employment; and 
3) the employee's conduct must be motivated, at least 
in part, by the purpose of serving the employer's 
interest. 
J.H. v. West Valley City, 197 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1992) . 
In the case at bar, the alleged acts of BC in spoliating 
evidence were not motivated by serving CBC's interest. 
Spoliation of evidence is contrary to the interest of CBC. 
Therefore, there can be no presumption of authorization when the 
actions of BC were contrary to the interest of CBC. 
Therefore, based upon the foregoing arguments, CBC is not 
liable for BC's alleged act of spoliating evidence in this case. 
Plaintiff incorrectly states in his Appellate Brief that the 
trial court in its order on the motion for summary judgment, 
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found that there was admissible evidence to support the claims 
that Mr. Blomquist admitted the "defective" part was discarded. 
Appellant's Brief Page 16. As stated previously in the section 
dealing with relevant facts in the case, this is plainly an 
incorrect statement by the plaintiff. The trial court's order 
for summary judgment concluded only that: 
as a matter of law, that the plaintiff could not prove 
a case of spoliation of the evidence without expert 
testimony setting forth that the part that had been 
discarded could have, under certain circumstances, 
caused the accident described by the plaintiff if that 
part were defective or unreasonably dangerous, or 
negligently installed. (R. 679). 
The trial court required competent evidence to establish 
that the purportedly discarded part was material to the 
establishment of the products liability claim. The plaintiff did 
not have the evidence to establish materiality. More 
importantly, however, the plaintiff has no admissible evidence 
that a part was discarded. 
The plaintiff cites cases that purportedly set out the 
general rule that the destruction of or spoliation of relevant 
evidence raises the inference that the evidence would have been 
unfavorable to the case of the spoliator, and is sufficient 
foundation for his guilt or negligence. Appellant's Brief 16-17. 
The plaintiff's theory of spoliation would require a presumption 
of defect whenever any repair service discards a part. This 
cannot be the law. 
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The cases plaintiff cite are distinguishable from the case 
at bar. In National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115 
F.R.D. 543 (N.D.Cal. 1987), the plaintiff's sought sanctions 
against the Veterans Administration ("VA") for destruction of 
discoverable documents and other discovery abuses. The VA had 
been involved in litigation for a period of three years prior to 
the destruction of the discoverable documents. The court in 
Turnage focused mainly upon the notice aspect of the case. The 
court highlighted the fact that the VA had sufficient notice of 
the discovery obligations it had to the plaintiff due to the 
three years of litigation that preceded, and that with such 
notice it deliberately destroyed relevant documents. .Id. at 557. 
In the case at bar, no litigation had been filed or even 
threatened at the time the purported spoliation of evidence 
occurred. 
In addition, in Nation-Wide Check v. Forest Hills 
Distributors, 692 F.2d 214 (1st Cir. 1982), which the plaintiff 
has cited in his appellate brief, the court held that: 
[t]he inference depends, of course, on a showing that 
the party had notice that the documents were relevant 
at the time he failed to produce them or destroyed 
them. The adverse inference is based on two 
rationales, one evidentiary and one not. The 
evidentiary rationale is nothing more than the common 
sense observation that a party who has notice that a 
document is relevant to litigation and who proceeds to 
destroy the document is more likely to have been 
threatened by the document than is a party in the same 
position who does not destroy the document. . . . The 
other rationale for the inference has to do with its 
prophylactic and punitive effects allowing the trier of 
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fact to draw the inference presumably deters parties 
from destroying evidence before it can be introduced at 
trial. 
Id. at 218. 
In both of these cases cited by the plaintiff, the main 
reason for the adverse inference was based upon the fact that the 
spoliator had sufficient notice that the documents were 
discoverable items, yet they proceeded to destroy the documents 
regardless. The emphasis was put on the purposely and wrongfully 
destroying of documents which they knew were supportive of the 
opponents interest. This was the holding in May v. Moore, 424 
So. 2d 596, 603 (Ala. 1982), which the plaintiff also cites to 
support the inference of guilt or negligence. Appellant's Brief 
Pages 16-17. 
In the case at bar, Mr. Blomquist and the BC were asked to 
repair the plaintiff's bicycle. (R. 558). As part of the normal 
practice of repairing bicycles, they would discard a used or 
broken part. No one asked BC to preserve or return any discarded 
parts. Neither Mr. Blomquist nor the BC were under a duty to 
preserve any of the parts allegedly removed from the plaintiff's 
bicycle. (R. 558) . The plaintiff presented no admissible 
evidence that a part was discarded by BC. (R. 572) . In 
addition, neither CBC nor BC were on notice that a products 
liability action was being considered or would be filed against 
them at the time the plaintiff's bicycle was taken in for 
repairs. (R. 558). Since there was no duty on the part of CBC 
17 
or BC to preserve such parts, and neither CBC nor BC had notice 
of a lawsuit at that time/ there cannot be any "wrongful/ illegal 
and intentional" act of spoliating evidence in this case. 
The plaintiff is merely speculating that an alleged 
defective product was destroyed/ intentionally/ by the BC in 
order to prevent the plaintiff from prevailing in subsequent 
litigation. Appellant's Brief Page 17. There has been no 
evidence to support such an allegation and there would therefore 
be insufficient facts that would allow a trier of fact to reach 
such a conclusion. 
Based upon the foregoing/ the plaintiff cannot prove a prima 
facie case of spoliation of evidence against CBC/ and therefore 
this court should affirm CBC's motion for summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's order granting the defendant's motion for 
summary judgment was correct. The plaintiff raises no genuine 
issues of material fact in his Appellant's Brief which would 
preclude this court from affirming the trial courts order 
granting the defendant CBC's motion for summary judgment. Based 
upon the fact that the plaintiff has failed to establish a prima 
facie case of a products liability action/ nor a spoliation of 
evidence action against the defendant CBC/ there is no genuine 
18 
issue of material fact in this case, and as a matter of law, 
defendant CBC respectfully submits that this court should affirm 
it's motion for summary judgment. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTIONN 
Utah Code Ann, § 78-2-2 gives this court jurisdiction to 
hear this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it granted 
plaintiff's motion for protective order regarding plaintiff's 
business records/ when no showing of "good cause" was made? 
2. Whether there is an ethical obligation and/or duty on 
the court and participating attorneys, as officers of the court, 
to disclose to the appropriate agencies, information found in 
documents produced during discovery which provide a prima facie 
case of violations of the laws of the State of Utah? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The following rules and statutes are applicable to issues on 
cross-appeal. 
Rule 26 (c), Protective Orders, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(c) Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by 
the person from whom discovery is sought, and for good 
cause shown, the court in which the action is pending 
or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, 
the court in the district where the deposition is to be 
taken may make any order which justice requires to 
1 
protect a party or person from annoyance/ 
embarrassment/ oppression, or undue burden or expense, 
including one or more of the following: 
(1) that the discovery not be had; 
(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified 
terms and conditions/ including a designation of the 
time or place; 
(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of 
discovery other than that selected by the party seeking 
discovery; 
(4) that certain matters not be inquired intof or that 
the scope of the discovery be limited to certain 
matters; 
(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present 
except persons designated by the court; 
(6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only 
by order of the court; 
(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research/ 
development/ or commercial information not be disclosed 
or be disclosed only in a designated way; 
(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified 
docioment or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to 
be opened as directed by the court. 
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole 
or in part, the court may, on such terms and conditions 
as are just# order that any party or person provide or 
permit discovery. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) 
apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to 
the motion. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-53(15)/ Unprofessional Conduct. 
(15) Any conduct or practice/ contrary to the 
recognized standards of ethics of the chiropractic 
profession/ or any conduct or practice which does or 
might constitute a danger to the health/ welfare or 
safety of the patient or public, or any conduct/ 
practice or condition which does or might impair the 
ability to practice chiropractic safely and skillfully. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-52(1) (1953, as amended). 
(1) The director of the division, upon the written 
recommendation of the board, may suspend, revoke or 
refuse to renew any license to practice chiropractic in 
this State, or may place the licensee on probation in 
the following cases: 
(a) If the applicant or licensee is not of good 
moral character or has been guilty of unprofessional 
conduct; 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-35(1). 
(1) The director upon the written recommendation of 
the board, shall deny an application for a license to 
practice medicine or shall discipline a physician 
licensed or otherwise lawfully practicing in this State 
in the following cases: 
(a) If the applicant or licensee is not of good 
moral character or has been guilty of unprofessional 
conduct as defined in this Act; 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-36(9) (1953, as amended). 
"Unprofessional conduct" as relating to the practice of 
medicine includes: 
(9) Aiding and abetting the practice of medicine 
by one not licensed or by one whose license is 
suspended; or practicing as a partner-agent, or 
employee of, or in joint venture with, any person who 
does not hold a license to practice medicine within 
this State; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1) This is a personal injury action wherein the plaintiff, 
Dr. Brian Burns, alleges that he sustained injury to his left 
wrist, neck, lower back and head as a result of a bicycle 
accident that occurred on August 16, 1986. He asserts that the 
Cannondale bicycle that he was riding was defective, causing him 
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to go over the handlebars while he was traveling at approximately 
twenty-five miles an hour on the bicycle. The bicycle was sold 
to him by the defendant The Bicycle Center ("BC"). Both 
defendants deny that the bicycle was in any manner defective. 
Both defendants assert that the accident occurred as a result of 
Dr. Burns' conduct. (R. 395) . 
2) Discovery was ongoing in this case since approximately 
April, 1990. The defendant Cannondale Bicycle Company ("CBC") 
had to file two motions to compel for the plaintiff to respond 
appropriately to discovery. The court granted those motions to 
compel. In the second motion to compel, the court awarded 
attorneys' fees against the plaintiff and in favor of the 
defendant CBC. (R. 395) . 
3) In the plaintiff's deposition, he asserted that he 
sustained loss of income as a result of the bicycle accident 
exceeding the sum of $250,000. The defendants requested that the 
plaintiff produce his business records, and those of Burns 
Chiropractic Clinic, Inc. in order to determine the accuracy of 
this claim. The records were formally requested from Dr. Burns 
through a Request for Production of Documents. The records of 
Burns Chiropractic Clinic were obtained using a Subpoena Duces 
Tecum. Five pages were produced on October 7, 1991, by Dr. 
Burns' accountants, Sorensen, Chido & May, pursuant to a Subpoena 
Duces Tecum served upon them on September 23, 1991. For the most 
part, the records that were the subject of the plaintiff's Motion 
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for Protective Order were financial records that were produced on 
August 9, 1991/ and September 12, 1991• The documents produced 
on August 9, 1991, were produced pursuant to a Request for 
Production of Documents sent to Dr. Burns. The documents 
produced on September 12, 1991, were produced pursuant to the 
Subpoena Duces Tecum and Notice of Records of Deposition served 
on the Burns' Chiropractic Clinic, Inc.. (R. 3 97). 
4) At no time prior to the production of any of these 
financial records was any stipulation reached between plaintiff's 
counsel and defense counsel for CBC regarding those records. (R. 
415-17) . 
5) The only stipulation reached regarding protecting 
information received in discovery is found in pages 124 and 125 
of Dr. Burns' deposition. (R. 413-14). In that stipulation, 
counsel for the respective parties agreed that Dr. Burns' concept 
of "working smarter" as outlined in the deposition, and that the 
sealed portion of the deposition would be kept confidential for 
use in this litigation only. There was no other oral or written 
stipulation regarding confidentiality of information received in 
discovery agreed upon by plaintiff's counsel with counsel for the 
defendant CBC prior to the documents being produced. Subsequent 
to the production of the documents on September 12, 1991, counsel 
for CBC agreed not to disclose the contents of the documents 
outside of his office, other than to clients, until the plaintiff 
had filed a Motion for Protective Order. (R. 398) . 
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6) At no time prior to October 29, 1991 did the plaintiff 
seek a protective order from the court regarding the financial 
records sought to be kept confidential• The documents that 
plaintiff seeks to keep confidential were produced six to eight 
weeks prior to filing a Motion for Protective Order. (R. 398). 
7) The documents that the plaintiff wanted to protect 
established a prima facie case of violation by Dr. Burns and Dr. 
Robert Morrow, an orthopedic surgeon, licensed to practice 
medicine in the State of Utah, of their respective professional 
licensing acts. The records further established a prima facie 
case of perjury on the part of Dr. Burns when compared with his 
deposition testimony. (R. 413-14). Dr. Burns testified that he 
had no fee-sharing arrangement with Dr. Morrow. (R. 414). The 
documents show otherwise. 
8) Dr. Morrow is an orthopedic surgeon who has his 
professional office in the same building as on of Dr. Burns' 
chiropractic clinics located at approximately 4500 S. 650 E., 
Salt Lake City, Utah. Dr. Morrow is a treating physician for Dr. 
Burns7 in this case. (R. 398). 
9) After the documents were produced on September 12, 1991, 
plaintiff's counsel requested that defense counsel not disclose 
those documents to anyone other than staff in defense counsel's 
office working on the case, and clients. Defense counsel agreed 
to do so in order to allow plaintiff's counsel time to file a 
Motion for Protective Order. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Rule 26(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, contemplates that 
a Protective Order must be issued from the court in advance of 
the actual discovery. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26(c). 
Specifically, Rule 26(c)(7) states "that a trade secret or other 
confidential research, development, or commercial information not 
be disclosed . . . " 
In the case at bar, discovery was done in August and 
September of 1991. (R. 398). Plaintiff's Motion for Protective 
Order was not filed until October 29, 1991, after the plaintiff's 
business records had already been produced to defendant CBC. By 
producing such business records without first procuring a 
protective order constituted a waiver of that privilege. Gold 
Standard v. American Resources, 805 P.2d 164, 171 (Utah 1990). 
Therefore, the plaintiff has waived any protection that he may 
have had by producing such business records in advance of a 
stipulation or protective order. 
In addition, based upon the requirements of Rule 26(c) (7), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "good cause" must be shown in 
order to invoke a protective order. In the case at bar, 
plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order did not provide any 
information concerning the specifics of why the business records 
of Burns' Chiropractic Clinics were confidential and required 
protection. "Purported trade secrets and other confidential 
commercial information enjoy no automatic protection from 
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disclosure." Turick by Turick v. Yamaha Motor Corp., USA, 121 
F.R.D. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). ". . . [T] o show good cause a party-
must demonstrate that disclosure of allegedly confidential 
information will work a clearly defined and very serious injury 
to his business." United States v. IBM, 67 F.R.D. 40# 46 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). Conclusory allegations in an attorney's 
affidavit/ that disclosure of trade secrets would hurt the 
businessf does not satisfy the requisite showing of good cause. 
Turick, 121 F.R.D. at 35. 
In the case at bar, the plaintiff has made conclusory 
assertions that the business records contained trade secrets that 
needed protection. (R. 378) . The plaintiff did not show any 
"good cause" for the protective order. Therefore/ the plaintiff 
has not met his burden of proof and the trial court abused its 
discretion when it granted plaintiff's Motion for Protective 
Order. 
Thirdly, the court and counsel/ as officers of the court/ 
have a duty to disclose to the appropriate authorities, 
information found in documents produced/ which provide a prima 
facie case of the violation of the laws of the State of Utah. 
Based upon a letter received from the Department of Professional 
Licensing/ the alleged acts of fee-sharing between the plaintiff/ 
Dr. Burns/ and Dr. Morrow are violations of their respective 
professional codes of conduct and Utah State law. Therefore, 
these documents that purport to show a fee-sharing arrangement 
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should be turned over to the appropriate agencies for 
investigation even if such documents were protected by a 
protective order as alleged by the plaintiff. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE PLAINTIFF HAS WAIVED ANY CLAIM FOR CONFIDENTIALITY 
IN THE DOCUMENTS BY PRODUCING THEM IN ADVANCE OF 
A STIPULATION OR ORDER, 
Rule 26(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, contemplates that 
a Protective Order must be issued from the court in advance of 
the actual discovery. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26(c). 
Specifically, Rule 26(c)(7) states "that a trade secret or other 
confidential research, development, or commercial information not 
be disclosed . . . " 
In the case at bar, the discovery was done in August and 
September of 1991. (R. 398). The Motion for Protective Order 
was not filed until October 29, 1991, after the plaintiff's 
business records had already been produced to defendant CBC 
pursuant to a Request for Production of Documents sent to the 
plaintiff on August 9, 1991, and a Subpoena Duces Tecum and 
Notice of Deposition on September 12, 1991. (R. 397). 
In Gold Standard v. American Resources, 805 P.2d 164 (Utah 
1990), the Utah Supreme Court held that the defendant Getty, 
waived its work product protection by inadvertent disclosure to 
the plaintiff. The Court noted that by voluntarily producing 
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memoranda in response to plaintiff's demand for production of 
documents, the defendant waived his right to the protection 
afforded work products. Id. at 171. In that case, which is 
analogous to the case at bar, the defendant waited to file its 
Motion for Protective Order until after the documents were 
already produced to the plaintiff. The court stated that "[t]he 
inaction and delay in filing constitute an independent waiver of 
whatever right Getty may have been able to assert, and the trial 
judge should have so found." Id. at 172. 
Although Gold Standard involved work product protection, the 
analogy can be made that by failing to demonstrate diligence in 
procuring a protective order for confidential information, 
disclosing such information prior to securing a protective order, 
is in fact a waiver of that privilege. And in the case at bar, 
that is exactly what the plaintiff did by not procuring a 
protective order prior to disclosing the business records of 
Burns Chiropractic Clinics. 
Contrary to the assertions made by plaintiff's counsel in 
his Memorandum in Support of Motion for Protective Order, the 
only stipulation entered into by counsel during the plaintiff's 
deposition was specifically limited to plaintiff's testimony 
regarding the concept of "working smarter", which was discussed 
in the sealed portion of his deposition. (R. 384-85). At no 
time prior to the production of any of the financial records was 
any stipulation reached between plaintiff's counsel and defense 
10 
counsel for CBC regarding those records. (R. 3 97). There was no 
other oral or written stipulation regarding confidentiality of 
information received in discovery agreed upon by plaintiff's 
counsel with defense counsel for CBC prior to the documents being 
produced. (R. 397) . Subsequent to the production to documents 
on September 12, 1991, counsel for CBC agreed not to disclose the 
contents of the documents outside of his office, other than to 
clients, until the plaintiff had filed a Motion for Protective 
Order. (R. 398) . The terms of the stipulation entered into by 
counsel during plaintiff's deposition relate only to the sealed 
portion of the deposition and do not relate to the business 
records produced in response to subsequent discovery. 
Plaintiff's counsel failed to obtain a protective order with 
regard to these records prior to their production to defendant 
CBC, and by failing to do so, plaintiff has waived his right to 
obtain a protective order with regard to the business records in 
dispute. 
Where such a stipulated agreement was allegedly made, a 
prudent thing to do would be to put such alleged stipulations 
into the record or in writing to erase any questions as to what 
was agreed upon. Where there is no admissible evidence of such a 
stipulation in the record or in writing, like in the case at bar, 
there should be a presumption that such an alleged stipulation 
did not occur. 
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Therefore, defendant CBC respectfully submits that this 
court should find that the trial court abused its discretion by 
granting plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order concerning these 
business records. 
POINT II, 
THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO SHOW GOOD CAUSE AND 
EVIDENCE OF SPECIFIC DAMAGE LIKELY TO RESULT 
FROM DISCLOSURE OF BUSINESS RECORDS, 
In reviewing a trial court's conclusion of law, the Court of 
Appeals applies a correction of error standard with no deference 
to the trial court. Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677 (Utah 
App. 1989), certiorari granted 779 P.2d 688, affirmed 788 P.2d 
520. 
The basis for the plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order is 
found in Rule 26(c) (7), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 375). 
Rule 26(c)(7) specifically states: 
[t]hat a trade secret or other confidential research, 
development, or commercial information not be disclosed 
or be disclosed only in a designated way . . . 
The plaintiff alleges that the business records of Burns' 
Chiropractic Clinics contain trade secrets and confidential 
business practices that are confidential. (R. 378). Rule 26(c) 
specifically provides that: 
[u]pon motion by a party or by the person from whom 
discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, may make 
any order which justice requires to protect a party or 
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or 
undue burden or expense . . . (Emphasis added) 
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The critical language in Rule 26(c) is "for good cause 
shown." The plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order did not 
provide any information concerning the specifics of why the 
business records of Burns' Chiropractic Clinics were confidential 
and required protection. (R. 378). The plaintiff's Motion for 
Protective Order made no showing of "good cause" whatsoever, but 
merely asserted the protection of Rule 26(c)(7) with not 
explanation. (R. 378). 
In Turick By Turick v. Yamaha Motor Corp., USA, 121 F.R.D. 
32 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), the defendants moved to dismiss a protective 
order and to compel discovery in a products liability action 
arising out of an accident involving an all-terrain vehicle 
("ATV"). In that case, the defendant made a Motion for a 
Protective Order, pursuant to Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, to limit the dissemination of its purported 
trade secrets and other confidential research, development and 
commercial information that may have been produced during 
litigation. The District Court held that "[p]urported trade 
secrets and other confidential commercial information enjoy no 
automatic protection from disclosure. Id. at 35 (citing United 
States v. IBM. 67 F.R.D. 40, 42, n.l (1975). The court went 
further and noted that: 
[i]n order to show that certain designated information 
should be protected under Rule 26(c) this court 
requires the party seeking such a protective order to 
show: (1) that the information rises to the level of a 
trade secret. United States v. IBM, supra, 67 F.R.D. at 
13 
46; and (2) that there is good cause to protect the 
information, Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c). . . . In this court, 
to show good cause a party must demonstrate that 
disclosure of allegedly confidential information will 
work a clearly defined and very serious injury to his 
business. 
United States v. IBM, supra, 67 F.R.D. at 46 (Emphasis in 
original). 
In Turick, the court concluded that the defendant "merely 
made conclusory allegations" in an attorney's affidavit, that 
disclosure of highly sensitive trade secret materials would hurt 
the defendant's competitive position in the ATV market. Turick, 
121 F.R.D. at 35. Consequently, the court held that the 
defendant did not make the requisite showing that the information 
raised to the level of trade secret or that there was good cause 
shown for the protective order pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c), 
and therefore denied the plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order. 
Id. 
The case at bar presents situation that is very similar to 
the Turick case. Here the plaintiff has merely made conclusory 
assertions that the business records for Burns Chiropractic 
Clinics contain trade secrets and confidential business practices 
that allegedly require protection. (R. 378). The plaintiff does 
not show any "good cause" by demonstrating how the disclosure 
would injure his business. (R. 378). The party seeking a 
protective order has the burden of proof of showing good cause 
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for the order. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus, 
Co., 529 F.Supp. 866, 890 (1981); Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank/ 
93 F.R.D. 471# 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). In the case at bar, it is 
apparent that the plaintiff has not met the burden of proof. The 
plaintiff "cannot generally rely upon his conclusory statements, 
but must present evidence of specific damage likely to result 
from disclosure." Rosenblatt v. Northwest Airlines# Inc., 54 
F.R.D. 21, 22-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
In Zenith Radio Corp., the court noted that: 
[i]t has also been held that the specific instances 
where disclosure will inflict a competitive 
disadvantage should be set forth in more than the 
briefs or the hearsay allegations of counsel's 
affidavit, for a protective order should not issue on 
that basis alone. (Emphasis added). 
Zenith Radio Corp., at 891. 
Therefore, in the case at bar, based upon the foregoing case 
law, this court should find that the trial court abused its 
discretion when it granted plaintiff's Motion for Protective 
Order without the requisite showing of "good cause" and evidence 
of specific damage likely to result from disclosing the business 
records of Burns' Chiropractic Clinics. Consequently, defendant 
CBC respectfully submits that this court reverse the trial 
courts' Motion for Protective Order in favor of the plaintiff. 
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POINT III. 
THE COURT AND COUNSEL, AS OFFICERS OF THE COURT, HAVE A 
DUTY TO DISCLOSE TO THE APPROPRIATE AGENCIES, INFORMATION 
FOUND IN DOCUMENTS PRODUCED, WHICH PROVIDES A PRIMA FACIE CASE 
OF THE VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
In the plaintiff's deposition taken on April 19, 1991, the 
plaintiff was asked by defense counsel for CBC the following 
questions and gave the following responses: 
Q: Do you have any type of partnership arrangement 
with Dr. Morrow? 
A: No. 
Q: Any fee sharing arrangement? 
A: No. We were originally going to, but it didn't pan 
out. 
(R. 414). The documents which the plaintiff now seeks to have 
ordered confidential show that the plaintiff, or Burns' 
Chiropractic Clinics, Inc., paid to, or received from Dr. Morrow 
the following amounts in the following years: 
1988: $52,383.91 [Burns to Morrow] 
1989: $43,170.00 [Morrow to Burns] 
$1,309.70 [Burns to Morrow] 
1990: $38,302.68 [Morrow to Burns] 
The documents show that a portion of this money was paid pursuant 
to a fee-sharing agreement. The fee-sharing agreement was that 
Dr. Burns paid 20% of the fee he received from the patients 
listed who were referred by Dr. Morrow to Dr. Burns. (R. 400). 
Based upon the letter that defense counsel received from the 
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Department of Professional Licensing, this type of fee-sharing 
arrangement is in violation of State statute, which the 
Department of Professional Licensing will investigate and, if 
determined to be accurate, will prosecute. See Exhibit "A" (R. 
409-11) . The penalty that may be issued by the Board of 
Professional Licensing includes suspension, revocation or refusal 
to renew any license. 
The statute that applies to a chiropractor is § 58-12-53(15) 
which provides as follows: "Unprofessional conduct" in relation 
to the practice of chiropractic, includes: 
(15) Any conduct or practice, contrary to the 
recognized standards of ethics of the chiropractic 
profession, or any conduct or practice which does or 
might constitute a danger to the health, welfare or 
safety of the patient or public, or any conduct, 
practice or condition which does or might impair the 
ability to practice chiropractic safely and skillfully. 
§ 58-12-52, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended) provides as follows 
in pertinent part: 
(1) The director of the division, upon the written 
recommendation of the board, may suspend, revoke or 
refuse to renew any license to practice chiropractic in 
this State, or may place the licensee on probation in 
the following cases: 
(a) If the applicant or licensee is not of good 
moral character or has been guilty of unprofessional 
conduct; 
With respect to Dr. Morrow who is an orthopedic surgeon, the 
following statutes apply: 
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Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-35(1)• 
(1) The director upon the written recommendation of 
the board, shall deny an application for a license to 
practice medicine or shall discipline a physician 
licensed or otherwise lawfully practicing in this State 
in the following cases: 
(a) If the applicant or licensee is not of good 
moral character or has been guilty of unprofessional 
conduct as defined in this Act; 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-36(9) (1953, as amended) provides in 
relevant part as follows: 
"Unprofessional conduct" as relating to the practice of 
medicine includes: 
(9) Aiding and abetting the practice of medicine 
by one not licensed or by one whose license is 
suspended; or practicing as a partner-agent, or 
employee of, or in joint venture with, any person who 
does not hold a license to practice medicine within 
this State; 
Attached as Exhibit "A" is a letter from the Department of 
Professional Licensing stating that fee-sharing by a physician or 
chiropractor is a violation of Utah law, which the Department of 
Professional Licensing will investigate, and where appropriate, 
prosecute. The documents which plaintiff's counsel attempts this 
court to keep confidential provide the basis for the Department 
of Professional Licensing to investigate and prosecute both Dr. 
Burns and Dr. Morrow. 
"Lawyers, including judges, have a duty to report 
unprofessional conduct to the appropriate authorities." See 
Blacknell v. State, 502 NE.2d 899, 3 Law.Man.Prof.Conduct 21 
(Ind. 1987). The Code of Judicial Administration states in 
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pertinent part: 
Cannon 3- A judge should perform duties of the office 
impartially and diligently. 
(A) Adjudicative Responsibilities 
(1) A judge should be faithful to the law and 
maintain professional competence in it. 
The Court and Counsel have a duty, as officers of the court, 
to disclose to the appropriate authorities, information found in 
documents produced which provides a prima facie case of the 
violation of the laws of the State of Utah. As officers of the 
court, the trial judge and respective counsel must be faithful 
and uphold the laws of the State of Utah. It would be 
inappropriate to order those documents kept confidential. It 
would be appropriate to order that the documents be provided to 
the Department of Professional Licensing for investigation. 
Because these same documents call into question the 
truthfulness of Dr. Burns' statements in his deposition that 
there was no fee-sharing arrangement between he and Dr. Morrow, 
these documents should also be forwarded to the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's Office for their review on the issue of whether or not 
Dr. Burns should be prosecuted for perjury. 
CONCLUSION 
Counsel for the defendant CBC respectfully requests that the 
court find that the trial court abused its discretion when it 
granted plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order on the grounds 
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that the plaintiff failed to show good cause and evidence of 
specific damage likely to result from disclosure of the business 
records. In the alternative, the plaintiff waived any claim for 
confidentiality in the documents by producing them to defendant 
CBC prior to securing a protective order. In addition, the court 
and respective counsel have a duty, as officers of the court, to 
report unprofessional conduct that violates the laws of the State 
of Utah. Therefore, defendant CBC requests that this court order 
that the business records of Burns' Chiropractic Clinics be 
delivered to the Department of Professional Licensing and the 
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office for further investigation. 
DATED this _ 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
i^l^r day of MA2&Jk, 1993. 
GARY) 
Attos^ieys—fxSlf D e f e n d a n t / A p p e l l e e / 
Cross*Appellant. 
Cannondale Bicycle Company 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
MAILED, a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument 
by first-class mail, postage prepaid this Jx^T day of 
, 1993 to the following: 
Edward T, Wells (A3422) 
Robert J. DeBry & Associates 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Darwin Hansen (A2058) 
Morgan & Hansen 
136 South Main, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-7888 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
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RYHTBIT A 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing 
onnan H. Bangerter 
Governor 
David L. Buhler Heber M. Wells Building 
Executive Director 160 East 300 South;P 0. Box 45805 
David E. Robinson Salt Lake City, Utah 84U5-0805 
Division Director (801) 530-6628 
November 5, 1991 
Gary B. Ferguson 
Williams & Hunt 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678 
Subject: Fee Splitting 
Dear Mr. Ferguson: 
Reference is made to a letter dated November 5, 1991, addressed to 
me by your Legal Assistant Susan M. Kertesz. In that letter she 
asks for a statement from the division with respect to fee 
splitting by physicians and chiropractors. In reply to that 
letter, and with the specific assumption that she is inquiring 
about splitting or sharing of fees by a physician with a 
chiropractor or by a chiropractor with a physician, the division 
offers the following. 
Unprofessional conduct is first defined, in part, under 58-1-2(6), 
as follows: 
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'Unprofessional conduct' means acts, knowledge, and practices 
which fail to conform with the accepted standards of the 
specific licensed occupation or profession and which could 
jeopardize the public health, safety, or welfare and includes 
the violation of any statute regulating an occupation or 
profession under this title." (emphasis added) 
With respect to the practice of a physician specifically, the 
pertinent statutory reference in which unprofessional conduct is 
identified is as follows: 
"58-12-36(9) aiding or abetting the practice of medicine by 
one not licensed or by one whose license is suspended; or 
practicing medicine as a partner, agent, or employee of or in 
joint venture with any person who does not hold a license to 
issstoei 
practice medicine within this state;" 
In the referenced letter, your office cites the provisions of 58-
12-53(15) which identifies unprofessional conduct by a chiropractor 
as: 
"(15) any conduct or practice, contrary to the recognized 
standards of ethics of the chiropractic profession, any 
conduct or practice that does or might consititute a danger to 
the public, or any conduct, practice, or condition which does 
or might impair the ability to practice chiropractic safely 
and skillfully." 
I think we must also refer to the provisions of 58-1-10, which sets 
forth unlawful conduct related to all of the professions regulated 
under Title 58. It states, in part: 
"(1) It is unlawful for any person to: 
(a) practice or engage in or attempt to practice or 
engage in any occupation or profession licensed under this 
title who is not licensed to do so under this title; 
(b) knowingly employ any other person to practice or 
engage in or attempt to practice or engage in any occupation 
or profession licensed under this title not licensed to do so 
under this title." 
This same provision is generally restated in the various practice 
acts and in the Medical Practice Act, such activity is defined as 
a third degree felony. 
In applying the above to the specific question posed by your 
office, the division's position is as follows: 
The publication entitled, 1989 Current Opinions. The Council on 
Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association, 
in Section 6.00, Opinions on Fees and Charges, discusses the 
subject of fee splitting. It is clear that fee splitting is 
outside of the accepted standards of the medical profession and 
thus is unprofessional conduct. 
The chiropractic profession has published a statement of their 
standard of ethics which states in Article IV, Section 4: 
"It shall be considered unprofessional to split fees or to 
give or receive a commission in the reference of patients for 
chiropractic service, except in cases where laboratory 
services are required and then the patient should be informed 
that there is an extra charge for such service" 
It is clear that fee splitting is also outside the accepted 
standards of the chiropractic profession and is unprofessional 
conduct under Utah law. 
If a physician is aiding or abetting the practice of medicine by a 
>ii n 
chiropractor, or practicing medicine with another who is not a 
physician, it is unprofessional and unlawful conduct. 
If a chiropractor is practicing medicine by his association with a 
physician, he is feloniously engaged in the unlicensed practice of 
medicine. 
The definition of the practice of medicine is so broad in the 
statute that I do not think the physician is prevented from 
practicing chiropractic and thus the reverse of the above paragraph 
would not be valid. 
If each is independently practicing within the scope of practice of 
their respective professions and simply splitting fees for referral 
of patients to one another, it is unprofessional conduct on the 
part of the physician and the chiropractor. 
Please do not interpret this as a legal opinion. It is offered by 
me as the division director to advise you with respect to the 
specific question you have raised. If you take issue with the 
position taken by the division, I would be pleased to receive your 
comment. 
Sincerely, 
cc: Steve Davis 
Ray Walker 
Valaine Pack 
Shirlene Kimball 
Physicians Licensing Board 
Chiropractic Licensing Board 
